Cite as
Addai, D., SectraTEK Lab (2026). Malware, spyware and stalkerware: three words, three responses. LAB-0019, version 1.0. https://lab.sectratek.com/research/lab-0019/
Methodology note
Drafted with AI assistance and reviewed by the author before publication.
Summary
- Malware is the umbrella term for software built to harm or gain unauthorized access. Ransomware, spyware and stalkerware are three branches, defined by what they do and who is behind them.
- Ransomware encrypts files and demands payment, often with a threat to leak stolen data. In 2025 the FBI's Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) received more than 3,600 ransomware complaints and says its loss figure is likely low.
- Commercial spyware is built to watch one person covertly. The record includes a leaked target list reported in 2021, a U.S. export restriction on the maker of Pegasus, an executive order restricting U.S. government use of such tools, and a U.S. court that found the same maker liable for attacking WhatsApp users.
- Stalkerware is commercially available software that someone, usually with brief physical access, installs to watch another person. The U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has banned one such vendor from the surveillance business. Advocates say a victim should plan for safety before removing it.
- The first call differs: law enforcement for ransomware, a digital-security helpline and an examiner for suspected targeted spyware, a domestic violence advocate for stalkerware.
Why the words matter
"Hacked" covers a stolen password, a locked laptop and a phone that someone else is reading. The response to each is different. A business owner whose files are encrypted should be reporting a crime. A journalist who suspects state surveillance should be talking to people who investigate such cases. A woman who suspects her ex-partner is tracking her phone may be put in danger by a quick fix. Getting the word right is the first step to getting the response right.
The words are also not fully clean categories. NIST, the U.S. standards institute, notes in its malware guide that real malware often combines several methods and that the classic categories matter less than they used to for incident handling. We use the terms below as a map of purpose and relationship, and we say where they overlap.
Malware: the umbrella
NIST defines malware as a program covertly inserted into another program with the intent to destroy data, run destructive or intrusive programs, or otherwise compromise the confidentiality, integrity or availability of the victim's data, applications or operating system. It is a category, not a specific threat. NIST's classic list includes viruses and worms, which copy themselves, and Trojan horses, which appear harmless but have a hidden purpose.
Ransomware is the branch most people meet through the news. CISA, the U.S. cybersecurity agency, describes it as an ever-evolving form of malware designed to encrypt files on a device and demand payment for decryption, and says its operators also threaten to sell or leak stolen data. In 2025 IC3 received more than 3,600 complaints about ransomware, with reported losses above 32 million dollars. IC3 says the figure does not normally include lost business, time, wages, files, equipment or outside recovery costs, that some victims report no loss, and that it counts only what is reported to IC3. Treat the number as a floor. IC3 asks victims of ransomware to file a report and points to the CISA #StopRansomware guide.
Spyware: watching without permission
NIST's glossary defines spyware as software secretly or surreptitiously installed to gather information on individuals or organizations. It is built to watch, not to lock or damage. What it can collect depends on the tool. Messages, location, files and, in some tools, the microphone and camera are the usual targets.
The sharpest form is commercial spyware sold to governments. Three parts of the public record show how it has been treated.
The Pegasus Project. In July 2021 Amnesty International and the Forbidden Stories consortium reported on a leaked list of more than 50,000 phone numbers that they said were selected for surveillance by customers of NSO Group in more than 50 countries since 2016. They said the list included at least 180 journalists. Amnesty's Security Lab examined phones and, according to Forbidden Stories, confirmed an infection or attempted infection in 85 percent of the cases examined, 37 in total. The Citizen Lab at the University of Toronto reviewed Amnesty's forensic methods and found their core to be sound. Being on the list is not proof that a phone was infected. NSO denied the reporting, calling it based on wrong assumptions and uncorroborated theories.
U.S. government action. On 3 November 2021 the Commerce Department added NSO Group and a second Israeli company, Candiru, to its Entity List, which restricts exports to the listed parties. According to the Commerce Department's press release, the evidence was that the two developed and supplied spyware to foreign governments that used it to target government officials, journalists, business people, activists, academics and embassy workers. NSO said it was dismayed by the decision. On 27 March 2023 Executive Order 14093 barred U.S. agencies from operational use of commercial spyware where they determine on credible information that it poses significant counterintelligence or security risks, or significant risks of improper use by a foreign government or person.
The courts. WhatsApp sued NSO Group in 2019. In December 2024 a federal judge in California found NSO liable under the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act and a California computer fraud law, and for breach of WhatsApp's terms, in a case that involved about 1,400 WhatsApp users. In May 2025 a jury awarded WhatsApp punitive damages of 167.3 million dollars. On 17 October 2025 the judge cut that award to about 4 million dollars and issued a permanent injunction barring NSO from targeting WhatsApp and its users, which does not apply to NSO's customers. NSO has long said its tools are for government and law-enforcement use, and said the reduced award is still disproportionately high.
Government-grade spyware usually arrives remotely, and in cases described by Amnesty (Pegasus) and by Kaspersky (a different campaign) it needed no action from the target (see LAB-0018). Apple sends threat notifications to users it believes have been individually targeted by mercenary spyware, and says the vast majority of users will never be targeted.
Stalkerware: when the watcher is someone you know
The Coalition Against Stalkerware, founded in November 2019, describes stalkerware as tools, meaning software programs, apps and devices, that enable someone to secretly spy on another person's private life. Kaspersky's annual report defines it as commercially available software that can be discreetly installed on a smartphone. Technically stalkerware is a form of spyware. What separates it is the relationship. The watcher is usually a partner, ex-partner or family member, and the software is bought by an individual, not a state.
The National Network to End Domestic Violence says almost all phone stalkerware requires physical access to the device to install. That is why a passcode that only you know matters. The FTC lists warning signs: faster battery drain, unexpected data use, overheating, a phone that turns itself off and on, and an abuser who knows your location or the content of private conversations. The first group can have innocent causes. NNEDV says the most common clue is the other person knowing things they should not.
The scale is hard to measure. Kaspersky counted 31,031 unique users of its mobile products affected by stalkerware in 2023, up from 29,312 in 2022, in 175 countries, with 799 in the United States. Those are users of one vendor's products and the true number is higher. The FTC acted against one vendor: the complaint against Support King, LLC, which operated SpyFone, is dated 26 August 2021, and its final order of 21 December 2021 bans the company and its chief executive from the surveillance business. The FTC alleged the company secretly collected and shared data on people's movements, phone use and online activity.
| Term | What it is | Who is usually behind it | How it usually arrives | In the public record |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Malware | The umbrella: any program built to harm or gain unauthorized access. | Many kinds of actors. | Varies by branch. | NIST defines it and says categories overlap. |
| Ransomware | Encrypts files and demands payment, often with a threat to leak data. | Criminal groups seeking money. | Varies. CISA and the FBI publish guidance. | More than 3,600 complaints to IC3 in 2025, reported losses above 32 million dollars (reported figures only). |
| Spyware | Covertly watches a device and sends out what it finds. | Governments or their suppliers, for the most advanced tools; others for criminal or commercial ends. | Can be remote and need no action from the target. | Pegasus Project (2021), Entity List (2021), EO 14093 (2023), WhatsApp v. NSO (2024 and 2025). |
| Stalkerware | Commercially available software that someone installs to watch another person. | An individual with a personal relationship to the victim. | Usually by hand, with physical access to an unlocked phone. | FTC order against Support King (2021); Kaspersky counts 31,031 users affected in 2023. |
Different threat, different first call
Figure 2 matches each situation with the first step that public sources support. The stalkerware row is the one most often done wrong. The FTC, the Coalition Against Stalkerware and the National Network to End Domestic Violence all advise that removing stalkerware can alert the person watching and may increase the abuse. They advise a domestic violence advocate first, a safe device for the call, and a safety plan. The FTC gives the National Domestic Violence Hotline as 1-800-799-7233. The Coalition adds that removing the software also removes evidence, so a victim who may want to report should think about that first.
For a phone that may need to be replaced or reset, the FTC calls a new phone with accounts the abuser cannot access the safest option, and the Coalition calls a factory reset almost as effective. Both say not to restore apps from a backup that might reinstall the software. On the iPhone, Apple's Safety Check shows and stops what you share with people and apps, and Apple says it cannot see everything, such as accounts and passwords or sharing from another device. Android phones differ by maker, so look for the manufacturer's own guidance.
| Situation | First step | Why |
|---|---|---|
| Files encrypted, a ransom demand | Report to law enforcement through IC3 and follow the CISA ransomware guide. | It is a crime, and IC3 asks victims to file a report. |
| A public role and a reason to fear targeted surveillance, or an Apple threat notification | Contact a digital-security helpline such as Access Now's. Consider Lockdown Mode. Keep the phone unchanged if it may be examined. | A scan app answers a narrower question than the one you have (see LAB-0018). |
| A partner or relative may be watching your phone | Call a domestic violence advocate, from a safe device, before you change anything on the phone. | Removal can be noticed and can escalate danger. Removal also deletes evidence. |
| An ordinary known virus or Trojan on a computer | Use reputable security software and install updates. | This is the case that list-based tools were built for. |
One phone can carry more than one risk. The phone that holds a stalkerware app may also be the phone that runs your banking app, and the habits that expose a person to one threat, such as delaying updates, widen the door for others. That is why it helps to know which threat you are asking about before you ask for help.
What an examiner can and cannot conclude
Stalkerware. An examiner can report that an app is installed, which permissions and special access it holds, when it was installed if the device keeps that, and that its presence is consistent with monitoring. An examiner cannot say who installed it, whether anyone read what it collected, or what the installer meant to do. The finding is about the app and the device. It is not a finding about a person's conduct. The Lab publishes a synthetic teaching set on how such apps can be told from benign look-alikes, and why false positives matter (DS-0006).
Targeted spyware. The examiner can say which published indicators were present in the data examined. The examiner cannot certify a phone clean, and the device alone does not name the buyer (LAB-0018). A name on a leaked list is not an infection, and an infection finding needs the device.
Ransomware. The examiner can describe what is encrypted and what the artifacts show about how it arrived. Whether data was taken and whether it will be leaked often turn on network records and on the attacker's own statements, not on one device.
For all three. An empty or missing result is not proof that nothing happened (LAB-TR-0034), and a victim should decide with an advocate whether the evidence should be preserved before anything is removed.
What this article does not claim
Read these before you rely on a statement
- The three categories are a map, not a test. Real tools can combine behaviors, and NIST says so.
- Nothing here accuses a person or company of anything beyond what the cited court, regulator, agency or report states. NSO Group denies the claims reported in 2021, and the court findings concern its attacks on WhatsApp users.
- The leaked list is reported by a media consortium and Amnesty. A number on it does not show that a phone was infected.
- The stalkerware counts are one vendor's telemetry from its own users and are not a count of victims. The ransomware count is what was reported to IC3.
- The article does not say whether Executive Order 14093 remains in force today. We read the order as signed and found no notice of a change either way, so check the Federal Register.
- The WhatsApp summary is accurate to the sources as read on 2026-11-08. Later court steps may overtake it.
- The article gives safety information from public sources. It is not legal or personal-safety advice. Safety plans belong with an advocate.
- The Lab examined no device for this article. Android and iPhone features are named only where a source names them.
Sources
Every number and claim, and where it comes from. Web pages were read on 2026-11-08. The Commerce Department's own press release could not be retrieved by the Lab's tools, so its wording is cited through the press report. Statements that could not be sourced were left out. LAB-TR-0034 is a Lab Technical Report on this site, with no DOI yet.
| Claim or number | Source |
|---|---|
| Malware defined as a program covertly inserted into another program to destroy data, run intrusive programs or compromise confidentiality, integrity or availability; classic categories (viruses, worms, Trojan horses); many instances are blended; the classic categories matter less for incident handling. | NIST SP 800-83 Rev. 1, July 2013, abstract and section 2.1. csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/83/r1/final. |
| Spyware defined as software secretly or surreptitiously installed to gather information on individuals or organizations. | NIST Computer Security Resource Center glossary, "spyware" (CNSSI 4009 and NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5). csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/spyware. |
| Ransomware as malware designed to encrypt files on a device and demand payment; threat to sell or leak exfiltrated data. | CISA, "Ransomware 101". cisa.gov/stopransomware/ransomware-101. |
| More than 3,600 ransomware complaints in 2025; losses exceeding 32 million dollars; the figure does not normally include lost business, time, wages, files, equipment or third-party remediation; some entities report no loss; counts only reports to IC3; victims asked to file a report; reference to the CISA guide. | FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center, 2025 IC3 Annual Report, ransomware section. ic3.gov, 2025_IC3Report.pdf. |
| More than 50,000 phone numbers selected for surveillance by NSO customers in more than 50 countries since 2016; at least 180 journalists; forensic analyses by Amnesty's Security Lab, peer reviewed by Citizen Lab, confirmed an infection or attempted infection in 85 percent of cases, 37 in total; NSO's response. | Forbidden Stories, "About the Pegasus Project". forbiddenstories.org/about-the-pegasus-project. |
| Leaked numbers described as potential surveillance targets; at least 180 journalists in 20 countries selected for potential targeting between 2016 and June 2021; NSO's denial. | Amnesty International, "Massive data leak reveals Israeli NSO Group's spyware used to target activists, journalists and political leaders globally", July 2021. amnesty.org, the-pegasus-project. |
| Attacks that do not require any interaction from the target, observed since May 2018; MVT released with published indicators. | Amnesty International Security Lab, "Forensic Methodology Report: How to catch NSO Group's Pegasus", July 2021. amnesty.org, forensic methodology report. |
| Citizen Lab found Amnesty's core forensic methods sound, on a sample of the evidence. | The Citizen Lab, "Independent Peer Review of Amnesty International's Forensic Methods for Identifying Pegasus Spyware", 18 July 2021. citizenlab.ca/amnesty-peer-review. |
| 3 November 2021: NSO Group and Candiru added to the Entity List; Commerce's stated reason. | U.S. Department of Commerce, "Commerce Adds NSO Group and Other Foreign Companies to Entity List for Malicious Cyber Activities", press release, 3 November 2021, read in full 9 November 2026. commerce.gov. |
| NSO's reaction to the listing. | CyberScoop, "Commerce Department blacklists controversial spyware company NSO Group", 3 November 2021. cyberscoop.com. |
| Executive Order of 27 March 2023: no operational use of commercial spyware where agencies find, on credible information, significant counterintelligence or security risks or significant risks of improper use by a foreign government or person; Federal Register, volume 88, number 61, 30 March 2023. | The White House, Executive Order on Prohibition on Use by the United States Government of Commercial Spyware that Poses Risks to National Security. bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov; Federal Register document 2023-06730. |
| December 2024 ruling: NSO liable under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, a California computer fraud law and for breach of terms; 1,400 WhatsApp users; damages still to be decided. | The Record, "Judge rules NSO Group liable for hack of 1,400 WhatsApp users", 21 December 2024. therecord.media. |
| Punitive award of 167.3 million dollars in May 2025, cut to 4 million dollars; permanent injunction; it does not apply to NSO's customers and is limited to WhatsApp; NSO statements. | CyberScoop, "Judge forbids NSO Group from targeting WhatsApp users", 20 October 2025. cyberscoop.com; TechCrunch, 18 October 2025. techcrunch.com. |
| Threat notifications go to users who may have been individually targeted by mercenary spyware; the vast majority of users will never be targeted; Lockdown Mode and expert help recommended. | Apple Support, "About Apple threat notifications and protecting against mercenary spyware". support.apple.com/en-us/102174. |
| Digital Security Helpline free for civil society, journalists and human rights defenders, around the clock. | Access Now, "Digital Security Helpline". accessnow.org/help. |
| Coalition founded November 2019; its definition of stalkerware; removal may be detected and could increase the abuse; a safety plan with a survivor assistance program; removing stalkerware also deletes evidence; a replacement phone is best, a factory reset almost as effective; do not restore from a backup that may reinstall it. | Coalition Against Stalkerware. stopstalkerware.org; detection, removal and prevention. |
| Kaspersky's definition of stalkerware; 31,031 unique users affected in 2023 and 29,312 in 2022; 175 countries; 799 in the United States; statistics reflect only mobile users of Kaspersky's products. | Kaspersky, Securelist, "The State of Stalkerware in 2023". securelist.com/state-of-stalkerware-2023/112135. |
| Almost all phone stalkerware requires physical access to install; removal may escalate abuse; safety planning first; the most common clue is the other person knowing things they should not. | National Network to End Domestic Violence, Safety Net Project, "Spyware and Stalkerware: Phone Surveillance". techsafety.org. |
| Warning signs; advocate before removing; use a safe device; a new phone is the safest option; do not restore from a backup; National Domestic Violence Hotline 1-800-799-7233. | FTC Consumer Advice, "Stalkerware: What To Know". consumer.ftc.gov. |
| Support King, LLC (SpyFone): complaint 26 August 2021; final order 21 December 2021; company and chief executive banned from the surveillance business; allegation of secret collection and sharing of data; later petition denied 8 December 2025. | FTC case page, "Support King, LLC (SpyFone.com), In the Matter of", docket C-4756. ftc.gov, case 192 3003. |
| Safety Check on iPhone with iOS 16 or later: review and stop sharing with people and apps, emergency reset; it cannot review accounts and passwords, social media sharing or sharing from another device. | Apple Support, "Safety Check for an iPhone with iOS 16 or later". support.apple.com, personal safety guide. |
| A claim that nothing happened needs a store that could have recorded it. | LAB-TR-0034, abstract (LAB-TR-0034). |
Version history and corrections
| Version | Date | Change |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0 | 2026-11-08 | First publication. |
Corrections log
No corrections have been published for this article. Corrections to any article are listed on Corrections, with the version they apply to.